Research has shown that people vary widely in their support or opposition to progressive taxation. We argue here that the perception of progressiveness itself is affected by the nature of the tax system and by the way it is framed, or presented. Experiments conducted over the World-Wide Web and using within-subject design demonstrate that subjects suffer from a range of heuristics and biases in understanding and supporting progressive or redistributive taxation. After reviewing some prior results, we report three new studies. Two of them indicate that people do not sufficiently appreciate the reduction of progressiveness that results from the use of tax deductions to partly reimburse private expenditures. The third indicates that people do not fully appreciate the reduction in progressiveness that results from cuts in government services. 
Introduction
The two welfare theorems of neoclassical welfare economics suggest a two-part agenda for public finance, as well as for economic regulation more generally (Kaplow and Shavell 2000) . First, policymakers should choose socio-economic policies that maximize social welfare, for which wealth-maximization typically serves as a suitable proxy; second, policymakers should redistribute the greater social wealth, through a tax and transfer system, to achieve a desired location on the pareto frontier. In public finance, this means that decisions about the proper role for the government, and the structure of that role -what public goods ought to be provided, to what extent, and how financed -should be made in a strict welfare maximizing fashion, minimizing the deadweight losses or excess burdens of the fiscal intervention (Musgrave, 1959; Rosen, 2001 ).
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Put in equivalent terms, any government fiscal action naturally has two effects, on the allocation of social resources and their distribution. Logically, the welfarist view of public finance entails separating out these allocative and distributive dimensions, to achieve an optimal merger of efficiency and equity concerns, in the spirit, say, of Rawls's difference principle (Rawls, 1971) . If a current government program is inefficiently designed, social welfare can be enhanced -and all individuals in society can stay at the same or a higher level of personal, welfare -by moving to a more efficient government (or private) provision, coupled with a redistribution of the greater wealth to meet the Paretian constraint.
So it is in logic. But there is a reason to believe that cognitive heuristics and biases get in the way of ordinary persons, such as citizens, understanding matters once two or more aspects of government action are separated; this is an instance of what we have elsewhere termed a disaggregation bias (McCaffery and Baron, 2003) . We present a series of experiments in which we detail the ways in which the extent of redistribution that subjects are willing to support depends on the form of government provision of goods and services: for example, subjects are willing to support a higher level of redistribution or cross-subsidization through the provision of a good than they are when the redistributive function of government is broken off, or peeled away, and left to stand on its alone. This violates the spirit of the two welfare theorems by generating a conflict between equity and efficiency -between total social wealth and the well-being of society's members -that does not exist in pure, rational theory.
In the present article, we ask whether people understand, and take into account, the distributional effects of two kinds of policy changes: the use of tax deductions as a way of funding services, and the effect of privatization or elimination of government services and programs. Our main hypothesis is that, by failing to take distributional effects fully into account, people end up supporting policies that undercut their own values.
General Experimental Method
We followed the same general procedure in each of the studies reported below.
Subjects completed a questionnaire on the World-Wide Web. Subjects were paid $3 or $4 each. Subjects came to the studies through postings on various Web sites or Usenet news groups, or through prior participation in other studies. Subjects were paid by check (after some minimum amount was accumulated), and they had to register their address and (for U.S. residents) their Social Security number in order to get paid, but they identified themselves only with their email address after they registered, and the email address was stored separately from the data, to assure privacy and anonymity.
Consistent with standard methods in cognitive psychology, our experimental designs were all within-subject (Baron, 2000) . Our subject pool is roughly representative of the adult U.S. population in terms of income, age, and education (Babcock et al., 2003) , but not in terms of sex, because (for unknown reasons) women predominate in our respondent pool.
In terms of precise methods, the studies were programmed in JavaScript so that one case was presented on each page, and subjects were required to answer all questions appropriately before proceeding. We recorded the time spent on each response, and we usually eliminated subjects who went noticeably faster than everyone else (outliers, typically 2-3%). Many of our experiments have had internal checks to assure that subjects understand the questions, and answer in the appropriate range; the first and third experiments reported below, for example, had such checks on understanding, the results of which we report.
Hypotheses
Research has long shown that subjects on average prefer at least moderately progressive tax rates (Lewis, 1978 , Hite and Roberts, 1991 , McCaffery and Baron 2003 . Redistribution through a government typically comes bundled with other fiscal actions, such as the public provision of goods and services. A type of isolation effect seems to lie at the center of many cognitive heuristics and biases: subjects focus on one aspect of a choice set or problem, ignoring (or under-considering) others (Camerer, 2000 , Read, Loewenstein & Rabin, 1999 , McCaffery and Baron, 2003 . Putting these facts together, we surmised that subjects would not always be consistently attentive to the redistributive aspects of a fiscal program.
In prior experiments we have found that subjects have preferences over the purely formal labeling of government charges -whether these are called "taxes" or something else, such as "payments" -that vary over the goods or services (such as education, social security, health care) being provided (McCaffery and Baron, forthcoming, and see also Eckel, Grossman & Johnston, 2004) . In an instance of an isolation-type effect, we found that subjects' preferences over the form of government fiscal mechanisms can trump their attitudes towards the redistributive effect of a tax or transfer program: that is, subjects would rather the government not use an income tax to raise money or to spend it, by means of allowing deductions through the tax (McCaffery and Baron, draft) . But in the case of raising money, an income tax using progressive marginal rates is progressively redistributive (from rich to poor); in the case of spending money, such a tax is regressively redistributive (from poor to rich).
In a dramatic example of an isolation effect that we termed a disaggregation bias, subjects chose inconsistent tax systems when they were asked to design global tax systems as compared to when they were asked to design a part of the whole, with full degrees of freedom in the part under their control (McCaffery and Baron 2003) . Once again we found that most subjects desired at least a moderately progressive tax system when asked to design a whole. But when half of the total revenue was collected by one tax, subjects underadjusted when choosing a tax system for the other half, although they were transparently able to effect the same overall level of redistribution or progressiveness as when they were choosing a whole tax system. Subjects focused in on what they were being asked to choose, making it moderately progressive, although the sum tax system then varied. In one experiment, subjects ranked their preferences for three global tax systems as: moderately progressive steeply progressive flat.
But when one-half of the tax was replaced by a flat-rate tax, and adjustments were made in the three taxes under comparison -such that the steeply progressive tax now had to feature a negative tax bracket at the lowest income range, to effect the same global distribution as before (as with the earned income tax credit under the current federal income tax (McCaffery 1999)) -subjects reversed their preferences, preferring: moderately progressive flat steeply progressive.
It seems that the salience of the negative tax bracket changed preferences.
Based on these and related results, we expected that support for redistribution or the progressiveness of the tax system would vary with the system's form, contrary to the spirit of the two neoclassical welfare theorems. For example, subjects might consider a method of deductions from a progressive tax to be fair, until they consider the regressive nature of subtractions under a progressive marginal rate tax system (compare the Schelling effect, discussed in McCaffery and Baron, in press). 1 Subjects might also support more or less redistribution based on the nature and extent of the government's provision of goods and services. In sum, just as taxes can be "hidden," and different systems can evolve on account of this cognitive fact (McCaffery, 1994, McCaffery and Baron, draft) , so too can progressiveness be "masked" or obscured from view by different fiscal mechanisms. We hypothesized that these "optics," as it were, would affect evaluation, leading to preference reversals and other inconsistencies.
Experiment 1: Tax Deductions
The main purpose of this experiment was to ask whether people favor tax deductions in part because they do not know, or do not consider, the fact that deductions benefit the rich when marginal tax rates are progressive. We asked this by looking at attitudes toward deductions before and after a de-biasing manipulation, in which we explained the effect of deductions on rich vs. poor and then tested understanding.
A second purpose of the experiment was to examine some of the determinants of favoring government provision of a good. We examined attitudes toward progressiveness, and perceived self-interest.
1 Schelling (1981) reported a classroom observation. He asked his students, given that a tax system would have child bonuses added to it, whether these bonuses should be higher for the rich or the poor. Students overwhelmingly answered for the poor. Schelling then pointed out that child bonuses presume a childless default rule; given a baseline of having children, the economically equivalent policy would be to institute childless penalties. Should such penalties be higher for rich or poor? Students quickly reversed their preferences, choosing higher childless penalties for the rich. We confirmed what we call the Schelling effect experimentally, a combination of penalty aversion and what we call a progressivity illusion. (McCaffery and Baron, in press.) 
Method
The questionnaire was completed by 104 subjects, ages 17-70 (median 34), who were 72% female. The introduction read:
Paying for goods and services
Goods and services can be provided in different ways. Here are the ways we ask about:
Government pays, and the money comes from income taxes. The rich pay a higher rate of income tax than the poor.
Users pay, and government reimburses them.
Users pay from their own funds.
Users pay, but the cost is adjusted (by law) based on users' different abilities to pay.
Note that when the government pays for something, the money must come from somewhere. Please assume that, in these cases, taxes increase to cover the cost, by some percent of the tax, for everyone.
Here is a list of the goods and services we will ask you about: We are interested in your views about how these goods should be provided and paid for.
The 10 cases were presented in an order randomized for each subject, and then they were repeated in the same order with different questions following each one. Here are the questions (with their names and comments in brackets, not seen by the subjects), using health insurance as an example:
The good or service in question is HEALTH INSURANCE Rate each of the following ways of providing this good or service. (Remember that government funds come from income tax revenues.) Government pays.
[Each item answered on a 9-point scale from "Awful" to "Excellent"] Users pay, and government reimburses them. Users pay, but they can deduct the cost from their income taxes. Users pay. No tax deduction. Users pay, but the cost is adjusted (by law) based on ability to pay.
Where you live now, how is this good or service provided? Government pays.
[Not at all
Partially Fully]
Users pay, and government reimburses them. Users pay, but they can deduct the cost from their income taxes. Users pay. No tax deduction. Users pay, but the cost is adjusted (by law) based on ability to pay.
[Second cycle]
The good or service in question is HEALTH INSURANCE A tax deduction saves more money for those with high incomes than for those with low incomes. The lowest earners pay no tax and thus save nothing from a deduction. Their tax cannot be reduced because there isn't any. But a person who pays 30% in tax will save 30% of the cost of anything that is tax deductible.
Assume that the rich pay a higher percent tax than the poor on their income. What will happen if the government allows people to deduct the cost of health insurance from their taxable income? The rich will save more money than the poor, from the deduction. The explanation says that the poor will save as much money as the rich, or more money. The explanation says that the rich will save more, but that won't happen in this case. I don't know.
Rate each of the following ways of providing this good or service. (You may change the ratings you made before.) Government pays. Users pay, and government reimburses them. Users pay, but they can deduct the cost from their income taxes. Users pay. No tax deduction. Users pay, but the cost is adjusted (by law) based on ability to pay.
How should the cost of health insurance be distributed between those with high income (the 'rich') and those with low income (the 'poor')?
The rich should pay more and the poor should pay less. The rich and poor should contribute equally. The poor should pay more and the rich should pay less.
Who benefits more from health insurance?
The rich The poor Both equally
How are you and those you care about affected by whether users pay for health insurance or whether the government pays? Better off if users pay. Better off if the government pays, even if taxes were raised to cover the extra cost. It doesn't matter.
How are you and those you care about affected by the relative cost of health insurance for the rich and the poor? Better off if the rich paid more and the poor paid less.
Better off if the cost were the same for everyone.
Better off if the poor paid more and the rich paid less. It doesn't matter.
Results
Factor analysis of the responses to the items about methods of payment (government pays, reimbursement, deduction, no deduction, ability to pay) together with the attitude questions (rich should pay more, rich benefit more, better for me if rich pay more, better for me if government pays) across subjects and across variables indicated two main factors, one associated with whether the government should pay. Of the payment items, "government should pay" and "no deduction" were the highest loadings on the government payment factor; on the graduation factor, the highest loadings were reimbursement, deduction, and ability to pay. (The attitude items had loadings completely consistent with this account.) Because our main interest was in the perception of the effect of deductions on graduation, we scored the deduction item by subtracting the mean rating of the reimbursement and ability-to-pay items from the rating for the deduction item. This insures that the attitude toward deductions will, insofar as possible, be measured by comparison to alternatives (thus removing the effects of tendency to rate all items highly), and also without contamination by attitude toward government payment.
Considering only trials on which the test question ("[w]hat will happen if the government allows people to deduct . . . ") was answered correctly ("rich will save more"), and on which the subject said that the rich should pay more -that is, only subjects who both understood the instruction and could be expected to have it move them in a less favorable direction -the mean deduction score was .26 on the first pass (where one unit is a step on the 9-point scale where 9 is "excellent") and .09 on the second (Ø ¾ , Ô ¼ ¼½¾ , across subjects). Each of the ten items, as shown in Figure 1 , showed movment in the expected direction, that is, against deductions after the manipulation.
In sum, the subjects seemed to be unfamiliar with the idea that deductions help the rich more than the poor. Many of them could understand this fact after a simple explanation. When they understood, they liked deductions less, especially if they were already inclined to support redistribution. But the movement against deductions was slight, and 28% of the responses to the test question indicated continued misunderstanding (with 43% of the subjects making more than one error).
In general, differences in attitudes toward payment mechanisms as a function of subjects (means across items) or items (means across subjects) were predicted by the relevant questions about perceived self-interest (whether graduation is better and whether it is better if the government pays), by preferences about whether the rich should pay more, or by perception of whether the rich benefit more. Tables 1 and 2 show correlations for subjects and items, respectively, with the level required for uncorrected one-tailed significance. The tables use the second round of presentations, where subjects were more likely to understand the effects of graduation.
Of greatest interest is the result in Table 2 , where subjects favored deductions on those items for which they felt that payment should be graduated, as indicated by the correlation of .85. (In fact, in a multiple regression of favoring deductions on attitude toward graduation and belief that the government should pay, only the former contributed significantly across items.) The same attitude toward graduation correlated with the other items that, in fact, helped the poor more than the rich (government pays, reimburse, and ability to pay), and it correlated negatively with the most obviously regressive proposal, no deduction. Subjects seemed to understand that with no deductions, the cost (in percent and hence arguably disutility terms) would fall more heavily on those least able to pay. But subjects apparently did not realize that this was also true for deductions, despite our informative manipulation (the effect of which was, as noted above, small). Indeed, given that the deductions occurred in a progressive marginal tax rate system, the users pay with deduction condition was worse for redistribution, given the lost or foregone government revenue going disproportionately to the rich -a subject tested further in our third experiment reported below. Subjects did not understand this. One source of support for deductions may have been the failure to notice their effect on the overall budget. The present experiment makes this explicit by showing it in a table. This is an experimental manipulation, so that we can assess the extent to which subjects fail to consider the cost of deductions.
The prior experiment explicitly said that taxes would have to be raised to cover the costs of any proposal, but subjects may have forgotten this, in part because it is unrealistic (taxes can be raised in the future, or spending cut, and so on). Subjects may have forgotten to consider tax increases relatively more in the case of deductions than in the case of subsidies. The present experiment drops this assumption.
Attitude toward deductions was compared to several different alternatives. Here, we used a single alternative, a rebate of 17% of the cost. The rebate was more progressive than the deduction, assuming that it is funded out of a progressive tax.
We asked a question about attitudes toward deduction four times: an initial baseline, a repetition of the baseline to control for order effects (Control), a condition showing the effect of a deduction on the government's ability to spend (Loss), and a condition showing both this and the effect on progressiveness (Progressiveness). The order of the last three conditions was randomized so that we could examine order effects.
Method
The experiment was completed by 135 subjects, ages 19-69 (median 38), 75% female. The introduction read:
Public vs. private goods
Some goods can be provided by government or by private companies. Here is a list of the ones we will ask you about. In some cases, government can provide a "basic" form of the good, and people who want more can buy more from private companies. We are interested in why you favor government vs. private provision of these goods.
Basic housing
The issue here is how government should pay, if it pays at all. One way it can pay is by giving a tax deduction. This means that individual taxpayers pay for the good. Then the government allows the taxpayers to subtract the cost of the good from their taxable income. They do not pay tax on what they have paid for the good. They thus get a tax reduction in return for paying for the good.
Another way the government can help is simply to pay for the good, or some fraction of it.
The 10 items were presented in four blocks. The cost of the various goods (used in questions presented below) was, respectively, $1560, $1040, $520, $260, $520, $1040, $1040, $260, $520, and $260. A random order of the cases was chosen for each subject and then used for each block. The questions for the first block were the same for all subjects. The order of the three remaining blocks was randomized for each subject. Here are the items, with names and comments in brackets, using tap water as an example.
[First set of questions: Baseline] 1. [Deduct] Suppose that TAP WATER is now provided only by private companies.
Individuals receive no help from government in paying for it.
Current taxes now average 17%.
Which of these two proposals would you favor? (Click one.) The government gives everyone a tax deduction for its cost. The government gives everyone 17% of the cost. These proposals are equal to me.
[GovHelp]
Under the same conditions, should the government help? The government should not pay for tap water at all. The government should pay some of the cost, but not all of it. The government should pay the full cost.
[GovNow]
Which description is more accurate for you, where you live, now? The government pays the full cost of tap water. The government pays more than half of the cost, but not the full cost. The government pays some of the cost, but less than half of it. The government pays nothing.
[DeductNow]
Which description is most accurate for you, where you live, now? The government gives a tax deduction for some (or all) payments for tap water. Employers pay for tap water and employees do not pay taxes on the cost. Employers pay for tap water and employees do pay taxes on the cost. The government pays some or all of the cost out of general revenue. The government pays nothing.
[Progressive]
In general, how should people pay for this good? The poor should pay more dollars than the rich. The rich and the poor should pay the same number of dollars. (Thus, the poor pay a higher percent of their income than the rich.) The rich and the poor should pay the same percent of income. (Thus, the rich pay more dollars than the poor.) The rich should pay a higher percent of their income than the poor.
[ Which of these two proposals would you now favor? (Click one.) The government gives everyone a tax deduction for what they pay for it. The government gives everyone 17% of the cost. These proposals are equal to me.
Results
The main issue concerns the Deduct question (preference for deduction vs. 17% subsidy) in the four conditions: Baseline, Control, Loss, and Progressiveness. We first examine the four conditions without respect to order of conditions. (As we discuss later, answers to the Deduct question depended on the order of the Control, Loss, and Progressiveness conditions. However, the answer to Deduct did not depend significantly on whether it was presented immediately after the baseline or last, with Baseline as a covariate.) Figure 2 shows the proportion of pro-deduction, anti-deduction, and neutral responses in each condition. Of primary interest is the mean attitude toward Deductions, coding Pro as 1 and Anti as ½. Subjects were, on the whole, less pro-deduction in the Progressiveness condition than the Control condition (Ø ½¿ ¾ , Ô ¼ ¼¼ , across subjects). They were also less pro-deduction in the Loss condition than in the Control condition (Ø ½¿ ½ , Ô ¼ ¼ ), but the Loss and Progressiveness condition did not differ significantly in their mean responses (counting Pro as 1 and Anti as 1). (Nor did the mean difference between these conditions depend on the answer to Progressive.) It seems that attitude toward deductions changes the most when subjects are reminded of the effect of deductions on government spending.
As we noted, we found no effect of order of testing on attitude toward deductions across the last three conditions. In particular, the Control condition did not change as a function of whether it came before or after the Loss and Progressiveness conditions. This result suggests that any debiasing effect of the Loss and Progressiveness conditions did not carry over to the Control condition when it followed them. However, the change in attitude from Baseline to Progressive was small (see Figure 2) , so an overall test is not the most sensitive one. To look for transfer effects, we regressed the subject's mean score in the Control condition on the Baseline condition (to account for general individual differences), the position of the Control condition (before, between, or after the Loss and Progressive conditions, as an ordered variable), the mean attitude on the Progressive and Loss conditions combined, and the interaction between this mean and position. The interaction term was significant (standardized coefficient .24, Ø ½¿¼ ¼ , Ô ¼¼¼½), indicating that the Control question is more strongly related to the other two questions when the Control question comes last than when it comes first. It thus seems that there is some transfer from the Progressiveness and Loss questions. Because of this, the comparison of the Baseline condition and the Progressiveness condition might provide a better indication of the magnitude of the effect of the Progressiveness manipulation, a larger difference than that between Progressiveness and Control. Notice in Figure 2 that the Loss condition led to more neutral responses. The wording of this item led subjects to think that the two options had identical effects. The effects were not in fact identical because they differed for different income groups, so our manipulation was misleading by virtue of being incomplete. This uncertainty, however, does not weaken the main conclusion: without prompting, people ignore the progressiveness effects of deductions. This conclusion is supported by the comparison of the Progressiveness and Control conditions. 
Experiment 3: Cutting Government Services
When governments raise taxes by a progressive tax scheme and then pay for services that cost the same to rich and poor alike, the net effect is to redistribute income, a "crosssubsidy" through the provision of the good. The rich pay more, the poor less, both income classes benefiting the same. Government provision in such a case saves money for the poor, assuming that the poor would buy the services if the government did not provide them, and the government provides them with reasonable efficiency. This is a paradigm example of the "bundling" together of two distinct governmental actions, allocative (providing the good or service in the first place) and redistributive. Were government simply to "privatize" or otherwise cut government services, without continuing the redistribution effected through the tax and spend program, a greater burden would fall on those who are relatively poor. Logically, the government can continue to redistribute resources through the tax system with or without the provision of the good or service. But will subjects support a consistent level of redistribution, however, independent of government provision of goods?
To examine the effects of cutting services on support for the overall progressiveness of the public finance system, we asked subjects to imagine that their national government could provide five basic services, spending equal amounts on each: defense, education, health care, social security, and everything else. We presented 16 cases in which government provided all possible combinations of the first four. In each case, we asked the subjects to choose the fairest level of progressiveness, including the possibility of negative taxes. Consistent with our prior research on disaggregation effects (McCaffery and Baron 2003), we anticipated that subjects would not maintain the same level of redistributionwould not fully take into account or integrate the effects of the service cuts on household welfare -choosing less overall redistribution with fewer services.
Method
Seventy-eight subjects completed the questionnaire. Their ages ranged from 19 to 64 (median 40), and 18% were male.
The questionnaire began:
Tax and spend
We are interested in how you think government expenditures should affect the distribution of income taxes.
All governments spend money enforcing their own laws and regulations. Many other expenses are optional. We are concerned here with five categories of spending: national defense; basic health care; basic education; social security; and "all other functions" (law enforcement, etc.). For purposes of these questions, assume:
The government spends the same amount on each of the five categories.
http://law.bepress.com/usclwps-lewps/art1
The national government pays for all of these services, if any government does.
The government contributes to a regional defense force (in the "other functions" category), so it does not absolutely need national defense.
Otherwise, the country is like your own country in standard of living.
The government pays $2,000 each year for each good or service for each household.
If the government does not provide health care, education, or social security, people must pay at least that much on their own.
Each screen shows several possible distributions of income tax among three groups of households: low, middle, and high pre-tax household income. (We exclude a small proportion of households that have little or no income, pay no tax, and receive some sort of assistance.) The three groups have the same proportion of all the pre-tax income. You see the average tax for each group. Here are some statistics for the three groups (approximatly correct for the U.S.):
Low Middle High Percent of all income 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% Percent of households in group 60% 30% 10% Average annual household income $20,000 $50,000 $130,000
Government can re-distribute money from those with high incomes to those with low incomes. It can have a negative tax, in which it gives money to some people in order to accomplish this re-distribution. Negative taxes are shown in red.
A typical item was:
In this case, suppose the government provides: NATIONAL DEFENSE BASIC EDUCATION ALL OTHER FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT But the government does not provide: BASIC HEALTH CARE SOCIAL SECURITY When the government does not provide a service that people must pay for themselves, the extra annual household cost is $2,000, regardless of income. How much extra will each household have to pay per year, on the average, because of what the government does not provide in this case? (Pick the closest.) $0 $2,000 $4,000 $6,000 Reminder: The average annual pre-tax incomes of the three groups are, respectively, $130,000, $50,000, and $20,000.
The first question, about the extra cost per household, was designed to encourage attention to this cost, but it could also serve as a check on understanding. The right answer was $2,000 times the number of non-defense cuts.
The basic case (with no cuts, such that all five sets of services were provided by the government) had a 25% tax for each group in the least progressive (top) distribution. When cuts were made, the tax for each group was reduced by 5% of income for each cut. Thus, the same response would represent the same degree of progressiveness, regardless of the cuts, if each taxpayer would have to pay 5% of income for the missing service. But the cost in dollars of the services described is independent of income, so the poor would have to pay more, and the rich less, than implied by this assumption.
In the case of defense, a cut leads to an increase in income as a result of tax reduction with no additional costs. The average increase in income is 20% of the baseline tax paid, or 5% of income. We thus assume, for example, that taxes of 25%, 15% and 5% for three brackets, respectively, is just as progressive as taxes of 20%, 10%, and 0%, if the difference is a result of a cut in defense.
The order of the 16 conditions (which differed according to what the government provided) was randomized for each subject.
Results
Six subjects always chose the least progressive distribution, which was equal percentage rates for all three groups, and 2 subjects always chose the most progressive. The mean choice was 3.42, on a 1-6 scale with 6 being the most progressive.
We calculated, for each subject, the mean effect of each cut on progressiveness, first ignoring the effect of cuts on out-of-pocket cost. The mean effects were, respectively, 0.11 for defense (Ø ½ ¼, Ô ¼ ¼ ¿½), 0.01 for health care (n.s.), 0.04 for education (n.s.), and 0.04 for social security (n.s.), where a positive effect indicates less progressiveness with the cut than without it. The mean of these effects was not significantly positive, and the four services were not significantly different. Thus subjects maintained the same degree of progressiveness without taking into account the effect of the cuts on out-of-pocket cost.
But cuts do affect out-of-pocket costs, at least for three of the goods of interest: health care, education, and social security, both in the experiment and probably in the real world. A more relevant analysis of the data therefore includes the effects of these cuts in public services on net -after public tax and spending -household welfare. Do subjects use the tax system to compensate for the effects of public spending cuts? If so, they would increase the progressiveness of taxes for these three goods. An attempt to make such compensation may account for the difference between the three goods and defense. But do subjects compensate enough? Or do they show an isolation effect, or disaggregation bias: maintaining a constant level of redistribution or progressiveness in the tax system alone, but supporting less global redistribution on account of their failures to take into account (or take fully into account) changes on the expenditure side of the government ledger.
The information we provided allows us to estimate the effects of cuts on out-of-pocket costs as a percent of income. The $2,000 figure we gave for the effect of each cut is, respectively, 10%, 4%, and 1.5% of the three income levels ($20,000, $50,000, $130,000). To achieve a redistribution between the high and low groups of 10% vs. 1.5% would require almost two steps on our graduation scale. Thus, to be conservative, we assumed one step for inferential statistics. Of course, we could not expect subjects to make these precise calculations, but we do think that the numbers we explicitly provided were plausible, so that subjects might have made some attempt to compensate for cost effects even without calculating, and evidently some did so, given the difference with national defense. (Further, of course, the government is unlikely to provide such precise cost calculations when recommending a tax and spending cut).
All three of the cost-yielding cuts (health care, education, social security) yielded corrections far less than the one step we assume would be required (minimum Ø ½ ¾ , Ô ¼¼¼¼). Hence, it seems clear that, while some subjects may attempt to offset the cost-increasing effects of cuts, on average the attempt falls far short of what is needed. Table 3 shows the mean response of subjects, using the same type of graph they saw, in the absence of any cuts and in the presence of three cuts. The lowest panel represents the results of including out-of-pocket costs. Table 3 gives an excellent look at the isolation effect or disagreggation bias, playing out in a unified tax and spending system. Subjects preferred at least moderate progressivity in the baseline, global condition, with government provision of all five sets of goods and services. With three major private-cost items removed from the mix of public goods, subjects continued to choose a tax system reflecting moderate progressivity, even accepting a negative tax bracket for the poor, as the second panel shows. But when realistic private replacement costs were built back in, showing a global tax and out-of-pocket effect, the overall system now looks regressive, in the bottom panel. Compared to the subjects' own chosen baseline, the bottom-line reflects a steep cut in costs (taxes plus out-of-pocket) for the upper income level, a slight drop for the middle income level, and a dramatic (¾¿¼±) rise in effective burdens on the lowest income level. By focusing on the "optics" of taxes alone, or disproportionately, a preference reversal in the bottom-line effects -what really matters -followed. Aversion to progressivity cannopt explain the results, given that subjects (on averaghe) consistently chose progressive taxes. Nor can ignorance of the financial effects of public spending cuts explain the results. Subjects made many errors on the test question about the extra cost per household caused by cuts. But the most common error seemed to be to simply count the number of cuts, including defense cuts, which (by specification) should have had no effect on household spending. Yet 95% of the subjects gave the correct answer or higher. Moreover, the mean answer to the test question was 2.53 on a scale from 1 to 4, where the mean correct answer is 2.5. Subjects did not underestimate the effects of public spending cuts on net household costs. The results were essentially unchanged when we examined only the subjects who estimated cost correctly or overestimated it, on the average.
What can explain the results is the disaggregation bias or isolation effect. Subjects looked only (or primarily) at the tax system when adjusting it. They did not adequately factor in the effect of public spending cuts. The result is that effective progressivity decreased as the number of cuts increased -disappearing altogether with enough "downsizing" of government.
Conclusion
Subjects who favor at least moderate progressivity in the allocation of public benefits and burdens -which seems to be the norm across time and cultures (Lewis 1978 , Hite and Roberts 1991 , McCaffery and Baron 2003 -can be easily fooled by the form of public finance mechanisms.
We found for example that subjects think too little about the effects of tax deductions on progressiveness. When they are shown these effects, they are less likely to support the use of tax deductions, but only moderately so. Worse, they seem to prefer a program of private provision with tax deductions to a system of private provision without tax deductions, even when the fact of a progressive marginal rate tax system means that the deduction element, standing alone, subtracts from the redistributive effect of government action.
In the third experiment, we found that people are also insufficiently aware of the effects of privatization or (in the case of defense) abandonment of government services on progressiveness. Most people want some progressiveness in the tax system: even those who favor a "flat tax" (in comments after Experiment 3) seem to mean a flat percentage rather than a flat dollar amount. Yet their failure to think through the effects of changes on progressiveness leads them to support proposals that undercut their own values.
The same mechanisms could of course work in the other direction. People who do not favor progressive taxation could fail to see the effect of changes that increase progressiveness, such as increased government funding of health care. In all cases, the puzzle is that the form of the provision affects preference reversals in attitudes about the substance of government fiscal actions.
We have focused here on the conflict between subjects' judgments and their own apparent values. But distributional effects are also real. Optimal taxation models typically take into account the declining marginal utility of money as well as the incentive effects of taxation (Mirrlees, 1971) . Under most welfarist models, some redistribution is beneficial, and policymakers are increasingly looking to public finance mechanisms to provide it (Kaplow and Shavell, 2000) . The kind of reasoning we have found here can pit equity (or redistributive) effects against efficiency (or allocative) ones, and can lead to truly harmful effects on the poor, beyond the conflict with attitudes.
The common psychological mechanism is one have explored elsewhere (McCaffery and Baron, 2003 and in press ): a disaggregation bias or isolation effect. In a nutshell, people do not think ahead, they do not integrate logically connected matters to form consistent judgments as to bottom-line effects and realities. In studies of the effects of marriage, for example, we have found that people focus on the question they are answering, without thinking of effects of their answer on other things they care about, such as the interactive effects of marriage bonuses, penalties, and tax graduation. Likewise, people prefer hidden taxes such as business taxes in large part because they do not think sufficiently about the necessity for the money to come from somewhere, and about where it will come from. Here we found that people under-account for the effects of government cuts on household finances when making judgements about the appropriate remaining tax system.
The problem of failing to think more than one step ahead -failing to put two and two together -is not of course limited to taxes and public policy. But especially given the absence of any natural corrective to these tendencies in the nonmarket sectors of public finance, they are likely, if left unchecked, to wreck considerable havoc there.
